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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The US Alien Tort Claims Act renders vindication to foreign claimants of gross human rights 
violations committed by multinational corporations. The Act was first employed on State 
defendants yet US courts now permit claims against private corporations. This development 
has brought serious allegations against several of the world’s largest corporations. Some of 
the allegations concern severe infringements of human rights such as mass murder, rape and 
genocide, while other cases address freedom of speech and expression. The Act provides civil 
remedies and distinguishes from legislation in other parts of the world. There are important 
procedural hurdles to impose litigation, nonetheless the Act has instigated a debate on the 
risks involved with transnational corporate activities. While several cases have been 
dismissed and other settled, corporate aiding and abetting is the most prosecuted field of the 
litigation under the Act. 
The US Alien Tort Claims Act derives its support from international law and thus both 
domestic as well as international law is imperative for its interpretation. The implication of 
initiatives from the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development as well as the European Union are discussed in a comparative manner. Several 
mechanisms have been proposed to attain greater corporate accountability, ranging from 
voluntary codes of conduct to binding international instruments. As corporations have 
become powerful global actors, the importance of foreign investments has developed into a 
discussion on the impact of multinational corporations in the global market and especially the 
implication of human rights. This thesis will discuss the current developments of 
accountability of multinational corporations with the starting point in the US Alien Tort 
Claims Act, a revision of the case law, and the importance of international and regional 
instruments especially in the European Union as well as United Nations and OECD.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The United States Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) has had a significant impact on the 
discussion on business conduct in developing countries. The Act is a two-hundred-year-old 
statute that has been employed for the past two decades to bring multinational corporations to 
court for human rights violations.
1
 The series of litigation was initiated in the 1980s with the 
Second Circuit case of Filartiga v. Irala-Pena.
2
 The case granted federal courts jurisdiction to 
hear violations of the law of nations. Since the decision, numerous cases have been heard 
pertaining to violations of international law. The ATCA has been employed to hold multiple 
actors responsible for violations of international law, such as State actors, private actors and 
corporations in their involvement of atrocities regarding human rights. This thesis will 
explicitly address the development of corporate accountability for human rights in the US. It 
is important to note that the ATCA does not cover all human rights abuses, but only those that 
violate the law of nations or a treaty of the United States of America (US).  
The US is the prime actor involving human rights litigation and multinational corporations. 
The success of the ATCA depends on a set of factors, such as jurisdiction, legal culture and 
rules of litigation. The US provides tools that are uncommon abroad and the nature of 
litigation differs as opposed to customs in Europe. International law will be examined, as well 
as voluntary approaches from the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), which still provides the most widely employed non-
binding guidelines. 
Transnational litigation covers a broad range of procedures. Both international and domestic 
forums provide vindication for victims. Yet in cases where a domestic forum addresses 
transnational law with abuses arising from conduct abroad and defendants with no citizenship 
or residency in the forum State, the litigation requires an extraterritorial application to assert 
authority. International law recognizes universal jurisdiction, but covers only a small range of 
offenses. Criminal trials were an important part of the vindication of the Second World War 
yet few similar prosecutions followed. It was not until the 1990s when the UN Security 
Council established international criminal tribunals that several countries around the world 
began to ascertain universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction permits domestic legal 
systems to assert jurisdiction over human rights abuses committed abroad. The doctrine is 
commonly referred to authorize criminal prosecutions.
3
 Current international law does not 
impose civil responsibility on corporations meaning that corporations cannot be prosecuted 
                                                          
1
 The Alien Tort Claims Act is also commonly referred to as the Alien Tort Statute, or ATS, 28 USC §1350. The 
term “Act” refers to the ATCA. 
2
 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
3 For the ATCA, reference to the violations in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has played a crucial role. 
Stephens, B., Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies For 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Intl L. 1, at 37, 2002. 
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before international criminal courts.
4
 The Alien Tort Claims Act renders civil litigation for 
victims from foreign jurisdictions and does not include criminal sanctions. The litigation of 
ATCA has both particular features to the US, as well as on the international scene. 
 
1.1 Purpose – Framing the issue:  
The impact of multinational corporations in global markets  
The thesis examines the prospects of attaining corporate accountability for conduct in foreign 
jurisdictions. Violations of international human rights law by multinational corporations 
remain by and large unpunished. This can be explained by a number of factors that will be 
considered in the thesis. International law is primarily addressed to States, however it has 
experienced a shift to hold private actors on the international scene accountable for human 
rights violations. In the limited cases where individuals can be imposed direct obligations by 
international law, the legal responsibility will depend on the available procedures of States. 
The absence of satisfactory institutional mechanisms in the international legal order allows for 
limited prospects to hold global corporations accountable. States are obliged to respect 
internationally protected human rights, either as Contracting States to international 
instruments or based on norms of jus cogens character. States must ensure the protection of 
human rights, including perpetration from private persons, but only to the extent the State can 
control such actions. In practice several nations are unwilling or unable to protect human 
rights norms.  
There are a multitude of factors which add to the current debates concerning the legitimacy of 
the ATCA and other similar legislative acts. The reluctance from States to regulate corporate 
conduct is vital and imposes hurdles to combat the resulting impunity of multinational 
corporations. The threat and fear of corporate movements from one jurisdiction to another, 
poses as an obstacle to regulation as MNCs can move investments to more beneficial 
jurisdictions. The available mechanisms to battle the impunity of multinational corporations 
are at this stage inadequate. This thesis intends to clarify the available mechanisms and how 
they can be employed in the legal setting. To facilitate a discussion on the future development 
of corporate conduct, historical aspects as well as non-binding norms will be mentioned. 
The intention of this thesis is to determine the contemporary developments in the legal setting 
and the forthcoming directions for the future.  The thesis will discuss the potential courses of 
legal accountability. The problems faced in the US and more particularly the ATCA, are not 
specific to that legal State. Since the case law draws upon international law and practice it 
also reflects current and possible hurdles to other legal structures. The EU and specific nations 
may have comparable obstacles if similar legislation will be enacted. In the context of this 
thesis, the task is to examine from a legal standpoint the extent to which States can 
legitimately pursue human rights objectives on multinational corporations. 
                                                          
4
 Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. 
Univ. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 2, at 315 (2008).  
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1.2 Method and materials 
The primary actor in the area of corporate accountability and human rights is the US and 
American case law is the primary source in this thesis, reference is given to international law 
as well as different regulations to provide a comparative perspective. Since US common law 
is distinctive to the civil law system, the approach of this thesis will adapt to the legal practice 
in the US. In order to understand the structure of the thesis a brief explanation of the US legal 
system is provided and where possible a traditional legal dogmatic approach applied. Main 
sources are legal text, official international documents, international and American case law 
and legal doctrines. Other sources are voluntary instruments and regulations. The European 
Union and Swedish legislation will be considered however disregarding a more specific 
approach to Swedish legislation since domestic laws do not cover this aspect directly. 
Corporate accountability on the international level constitutes to a large extent of soft-law, 
and the topic tends to be examined with a theoretical and analytical approach in literature and 
doctrine. It is hard to obtain a strict legal perspective to such frameworks, nevertheless the 
intention of the thesis is to establish legal aspects where possible. The nature of the thesis is 
interdisciplinary, combining corporate law and human rights norms, and thus provides a 
combination of international law and domestic legal sources, as well as non-binding 
documents and other regional instruments. While there are several legislations and regulations 
relevant in the field of human rights only a few will be examined due to the scope of the 
thesis, limited to regulations that deal with the two disciplines specifically as well as cover the 
most influential tools. Since violation of international law is not a secluded event, the 
interplay with other fields and links to corporate initiatives will be addressed and compared to 
a legislative aspect. Thus links to Corporate Social Responsibility, codes of conduct and 
corporate governance are further important tools to understand the scope and limit of the 
ATCA.  
 
1.3 Definition 
1.3.1 The business structure of multinational corporations 
The terms multinational and transnational corporations (MNCs, TNCs) as well as 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been used interchangeably in different international 
instruments and scholarly works.
5
 The terms are employed in a variety of contexts and there is 
no general consensus how to utilize and define such corporations.  No matter how TNCs, 
                                                          
5 Generally the term TNC and MNC refers to a corporation with affiliated business operations in more than one 
country. MNE in turn is defined as companies or other entities established in more than one country yet linked in 
various ways to co-ordinate the operations, the ownership may be private, State or mixed, see part I, § 3 of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, entered in to force 15 February 1999. The Draft UN Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations defines TNC as enterprises that operate in two or more countries, 
regardless of legal form and fields of activity. It also employs a common strategy that links the entites, see Draft 
UN Code § 1 (a); UN Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, adopted on 13 August 2003, UN Doc., E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2. 
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MNCs and MNEs are defined, the corporations tend in general to be large, politically 
influential and autonomous entities that can move operations from separate countries.
6
 MNCs 
within the international system are economically influential and larger than some national 
economies. MNCs can exert influence that approaches the level of States or even surpassing 
it.
7
 In this thesis the terminology covers all different definitions employed in the international 
level. There is no intention to limit the coverage but rather to include a broad scope. Not only 
multinational enterprises but also other smaller corporations engage in activities that relate to 
international commerce, import and exports, without direct dealing with foreign subsidiaries. 
Businesses which can operate locally but be linked to international commerce and 
corporations through supply chains despite being principally active in a local or national 
market, can still have a significant impact on human rights.
8
 The importance of the promotion 
of human rights should not be limited by strict definitions of corporate entities since all 
businesses are competing in a global market and rather as the thesis shows, concepts of 
accountability cover a wide range of corporate conduct. It can also be difficult to distinguish 
the status of corporations, the control structures and forms of ownership which can be non-
transparent. There are various forms of business structures, such as joint ventures, suppliers, 
partnerships, limited liability partnerships or limited liability companies, unincorporated 
associations and other contractual relationships are just a few examples.
9
  
Globalization and outsourcing has for the past two decades resulted in the development of 
complex supply networks. These are often led by multinational Western companies. These 
developments have inflicted less legal obligations on parent companies and instead turned to 
suppliers that often have weak or weakly enforced regulation. This has in turn moved focus to 
other initiatives, such as the voluntary corporate codes of conduct. Implementing and 
monitoring of these codes of conduct has proved difficult.
10
 
 
1.4 Disposition    
The structure of the thesis is adapted to the structure of common law as well as international 
law. Common law derives its foundation and principles from case law and the approach of the 
thesis will be based from an interpretation of case law such as the scholarly debate is set in the 
US. The cases address alleged violations of human rights occurring in developing countries or 
places governed by oppressive regimes. The plaintiffs have in all cases relied on the Alien 
                                                          
6 A vital factor to the definition is the exercise of control, as opposed to a financial stake in a foreign venture. 
The level of control enables co-ordination among the business structure, instead of being composed of a network 
of independent entities. Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 
20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 45, at 47-48 (2002). 
7
 John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at 3 (2008). 
8 David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 901,  at 909 (2003). 
9
 Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 8, at 909-910. 
10
 Andrew Crane, Abagail McWilliams, Dirk Matten, Jeremy Moon, & Donald S. Siegel, The Oxford Handbook 
of Corporate Social Responsibility, Oxford University Press, New York, at 377 (2008). 
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Tort Claims Act as a legal basis for claims. The cases concern abuses that have occurred in 
conjunction with the operations of multinational corporations or have an impact on the 
development of corporate accountability. The recent development in the US has opened up a 
debate concerning global corporate liability. This debate relates to greater concern with 
international relations, State sovereignty and extraterritorial jurisdiction. The purpose of the 
general background is to introduce the nature of the accusations and some key legal issues 
brought before the courts. The following chapter provides for a regulatory approach mainly 
focusing on non-binding and voluntary measures, as opposed to the subsequent chapters that 
deal with legal matters. This thesis will mainly deal with home State responsibility, since the 
role of host States and imposing regulation on behalf of developing countries is often not 
feasible. 
The thesis explains how the ATCA is justified to hold MNCs accountable to enforce 
international human rights norms. The history behind the ATCA and how it was prior 
employed, followed by matters considering multinational operations, will be examined. 
Important cases highlight the limits and potential remedies of the Act. The effects on 
corporate accountability will be concluded to present the extent of MNC responsibility 
followed by a discussion on legal issues. 
 
1.6 Delimitations 
Several international instruments aspire to promote the respect of human rights by 
multinational corporations. These instruments denounce egregious violations of human rights, 
highlight environmental concerns as part of promotion as well as support labor organizations 
engaging employment and working standards.
11
 This thesis will look to human rights of the 
most serious violations of international human rights law. The subject of this thesis involves 
numerous areas of international law, not only corporate statutes and human rights norms, but 
also issues on the limits of jurisdiction and State conduct on foreign soil as well as immunity 
of State officials. Politics and the powers of government inevitably has important functions, 
codes of conduct incline the role of non-binding norms, and the conflict between international 
and domestic law all raise important issues and hurdles to address corporate liability. 
Furthermore State responsibility and the distinction between criminal and civil liability are 
other important matters. The influence of norms and other market participants are important 
in order to recognize the direction the accountability movement has taken and further the 
prospect of greater liability. These topics will briefly be discussed, however only to a limited 
extent. Multinational accountability also interplays with other concepts of international law, 
and has the character of a comparative analysis, as well as an interdisciplinary aspect. 
The discussion on jurisdiction over gross human rights violations is limited to cover the vital 
aspects. Separate Member States of the European Union have acclaimed universal jurisdiction 
                                                          
11 See the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
regulates conditions in developing nations. Environmental torts are not considered to fall within the law of 
nations by the courts at this stage, see Ajuindo v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2nd Cir. 2002). See also Jota v. 
Texaco, 157 F3d 153, 155-56 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
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but this thesis only governs a general approach of the region as such except for one paragraph 
on Sweden. The EU has not developed legal corporate accountability within the union as a 
whole, yet does address jurisdictional issues specifically. The Organization of Security and 
Co-operation in Europe and Council of Europe are important intergovernmental structures 
that work with human rights.
 12
 This will not be addressed to any greater extent.  
The concept Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is also rather important to note however 
this approach is voluntary in essence. This thesis focuses instead on legal mechanisms but will 
briefly mention the concept of CSR and its implication on MNCs. While important guidelines 
from the OECD, UN and EU will be addressed, several other aspects converging with human 
rights concerns cannot be addressed in this thesis due to the scope of the subject. Specific 
instruments address, among other subjects, labor and environmental concerns, all of which 
can be linked with distinct human rights, but require a separate analysis. Several 
developments are taking place in the field of corporate reporting dealing with standards of 
accounting as well as information, yearly and quarterly financial reports, which have a 
bearing on CSR.  However these changes and their analysis will not be included.
13
 
There are several organizations within the UN dealing mainly with the human rights regime.
14
 
This thesis will only address the instruments dealing specifically with human rights and 
multinational corporations. The impact of NGOs is also vital, but will not be addressed in this 
thesis. The US Torture Victim Protection Act also provides for jurisdiction on torture and 
extra-judicial killings committed abroad but will not be covered.   
The aim of this thesis is not to provide a full and exhaustive list of tools or mechanisms 
dealing with MNCs and their negative impact on human rights. Rather the thesis looks to 
focus on the ATCA legislation as it has been at the forefront of this aspect. The development 
among nations and regions of the world, as well as international, regional and national 
programs do not have the same bearing or impact as the ATCA, but will be addressed for 
reasons of comparability. 
                                                          
12
 The Council of Europe is today an international organization that promotes standards, provides charters and 
Conventions to improve cooperation. 
13 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was established by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (CERES) that today constitutes of several international groups, such as NGOs, corporations and 
accounting firms. It co-operates with the UN Environment Programme and UN Global Compact. The aim is to 
promote guidelines to reports of CSR. More on this topic, see http://www.globalreporting.org/Home [last visited 
on 13.11.09]. 
14 Another possible approach is to link nations with trade arrangements to meet the commitments to human 
rights. Under the United Nations framework, trade sanctions are one of the mechanisms available to enforce 
international law. MNCs are the beneficiaries of trade arrangements and a matter of interest is whether trade 
arrangements can be used to further human rights in third countries. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) can be possible routes to such an arrangement but will not be 
discussed in this thesis. A further approach can be that the European Community advances and promotes human 
rights by trade arrangement on the level of the EU as a unit, rather than individual Member States pursuing their 
own agenda.  More on this, see Olufemi Amao, Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and Multinational Corporations: 
The EU-ACP Context, 32 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 379, at 393 (2009).  
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2 BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 An introduction to the United States legal system 
The United States of America (US) is governed by a three-tiered system consisting of the 
judiciary, legislative and executive branches.
15
 There are various types of courts within the 
US judiciary. Of these the three main types are: the US District Courts which are general trial 
based courts, the US Court of Appeals, that are geographically numbered which has appellate 
jurisdiction and the court of last resort, the Supreme Court of the United States. Besides these 
there are also courts with jurisdiction over specific subject matters. A higher court decision 
gains more influence and lower courts follow precedents.
16
 Reference to US case law often 
stresses the level of the court and it is also important to view later court decisions in order to 
gain an understanding of current common law and the interpretation of international law.
17
 
Certain procedural rules are particular to the US legal system and will thus be briefly 
explained in this context. US courts apply local procedural rules to all action, irrespective of 
the law governing the substantive claim. Favorable rules of civil procedure render the US 
legal system rather affirmative for vindication of international human rights violations. 
Factors of significance are the practice of contingency fees and the possibility to obtain 
considerable punitive damages.
18
 Costs and fees, class action suits, as well as rules of public 
litigation enable the probability of successful proceedings.
19
 Discovery rules, such as the 
hearing of complaints and the allowance of evidence obtained from defendants, are factors 
that give the US the ability to claim such broad remedies to human rights abuses.
20
 This is 
partly the explanation why civil redress of international human rights has developed in the US 
and not in other parts of the world. 
The US has certain unique features to its legal system. These include but are not limited to, 
aspects of legal culture and jurisdictional concerns. The Alien Tort Claims Act is an old statute 
that only for the past two decades has gathered consideration and gained influence. The 
ATCA only prescribes civil redress by torts as opposed to criminal proceedings. Civil 
litigation in the US is commonly employed as means to promote social reform and is an 
important part of the legal culture. The reform of public interest and public policy is intended 
                                                          
15
 The separation of powers divides governmental authority with checks and balances of each branch and the 
separation is strictly maintained. The ATCA inflicts a debate on the political powers of the US government since 
corporate decisions on human rights impinges on the legislative branch. 
16
 US courts do not derive from prior decisions of the Supreme Court, nor alter earlier decisions from the same 
court  level (stare decisis), as opposed to civil law where the same court level may be derived from.  
17
 Stephens, supra note 3, at 13-17. 
18
 Cedric Ryngaert, Universal Tort Jurisdiction Over Gross Human Rights Violations, Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, at 3-4 and 33 (2007). Contingency fees provides 
that the services of a lawyer are only charged if the lawsuit is successful or favorably settled outside the court, 
see Black‟s Law Dictionary. 
19
 Class action are lawsuits representing a larger group of people, there are specific requirements for maintaining 
class action, see Black‟s Law Dictionary. 
20
 Stephens, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
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to develop through civil cases on human rights. This in turn has enabled the growth of non-
profit litigation offices and pro bono assistance from private firms. Public interest litigation 
may not always ensure enforceable judgments in favor of the victims, but corresponds to 
policy goals of the US and despite the lack of criminal sanctions, the public aspect of the Act 
serves as compensation for victims in terms of punitive damages as well as public exposure.
21
 
Particular legal matters to the US also include jurisdictional concerns. Personal jurisdiction is 
the power of the court to bring a person under its jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction 
depends on the nature of the case and the claims for relief.
22
 With the enactment of the 
ATCA, US Congress authorized US federal courts jurisdiction over international human 
rights abuses. The Congress can assert subject matter jurisdiction by enacting legislation as 
long as it meets the requirements of the US Constitution (USC). Legal issues are then decided 
by the law indicated from Congress, in this case the ATCA is governed by international law 
and other statutes under US law. In order for US courts to hear claims on MNCs, it is required 
that the court has personal jurisdiction as well as subject-matter jurisdiction.
23
 Some of the 
reasons acclaiming the US as the main actor of the vindication of human rights abuses by 
MNCs are the liberal requirements for personal jurisdiction in the US. For acts committed 
abroad, transitory presence is considered sufficient for jurisdiction.
24
 Solely minimum 
contacts with the jurisdiction are required for the corporation to be asserted jurisdiction in the 
US. Temporary presence in the US provides jurisdiction and is only common in the Anglo-
American legal tradition.
25
 The rule applies equally to domestic and foreign defendants and 
provides for greater jurisdiction than other countries. Individuals, even corporate executives, 
and corporations, doing business within the country can be considered under US 
jurisdiction.
26
  
There are further cultural and regional aspects explaining the position of the US legal system. 
It is possible to claim that the US legal system encourages litigation, as well as that the 
society is exceedingly litigious compared to other nations of the world. For example, the 
Member States of the EU do not have a similar legal culture. There are contrasts between the 
US and the EU, as well as among Member States of the EU and states within the US that 
explain their respective differing positions concerning MNCs.
27
 Despite the favorable legal 
culture it is important to note that there have only been a small number of proceedings under 
                                                          
21
 Stephens, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
22
 Black‟s Law Dictionary. 
23
 Stephens, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
24 Transitory jurisdiction is based on temporary presence of a defendant in the territory of the forum State.  
25
 Stephens, supra note 3, at 22. 
26
 Stephens, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
27 The corporate climate in the US provides for a great assortment of business structures and no state corporate 
statutes are identical yet several statutes are based on model acts providing uniformity. The Model Business 
Corporation Act has been enacted with revisions by the majority of states. Note however that the most prominent 
corporate law states Delaware, New York and California all have their own statutes. See Alan R. Palmiter, 
Corporations Examples & Explanations, Aspen Publishers, New York, at 8-9 (2006). 
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the ATCA meaning that several procedural obstacles remain for successful litigation against 
corporations.
28
 
 
2.2 Civil accountability 
In the international legal system the first distinction among nations that is drawn is between 
civil and common law countries. Within each of these, there is a further distinction of law into 
civil and criminal law, the definitions and aspects of which, also vary from country to 
country.
29
 At the national level the accountability under civil and criminal law varies and is 
dependent upon the legal structure.
30
 The varieties of civil and criminal claims in domestic 
legal systems constitute of categories that depend on legal definitions, thus a comparative 
approach on the divide between civil and criminal law, from international to domestic claims, 
as well as establishing jurisdiction is rather difficult. A distinction between civil and criminal 
liability is however of necessity in this thesis. Whilst civil accountability will offer 
compensation and thus monetary remedy for victims of human rights violations, criminal 
liability can provide for other punitive tools. International law commonly provides for norms 
under criminal law, and as such the ATCA‟s norms have also been derived from international 
criminal law despite the fact that ATCA only provides for civil remedy. This imposes hurdles 
of its application and scholars do not agree whether such principles and case law indicating 
customary international law is applicable to corporate conduct and tort cases.  
The US is the only country where civil litigation against corporations has emerged, and it 
appears likely that this development will persist. The Alien Tort Claims Act refers to 
international law, while other States, although applying criminal jurisdiction, also employ 
domestic principles. This interrelation between civil and criminal law, and principles derived 
from international as well as domestic law, has important consequences to the approach of 
corporate accountability. Besides the means of redress, where tort compensation and criminal 
proceedings vary greatly, it also provides for various possible outcomes. These possible legal 
remedies also grant varied legal systems the alternative to adapt legal accountability in each 
nation and region in support and protection of human rights.
31
 
 
2.3 The attribution of corporate accountability 
Crimes committed by multinational corporations in practice involve relations with several 
actors. It includes the MNC itself which could consist of several entities around the world, the 
plaintiffs, often victims of egregious human rights violations, the host State, where the events 
                                                          
28
 Stephens, supra note 3, at 16. 
29
 Stephens, supra note 6, at 43-45. 
30 While the distinction between civil and criminal accountability is important, it is in practice often blurred. 
Criminal proceedings also allow for victim reparation, and tort judgments allow for punishment and moral 
condemnation by the high damages and holding the actors responsible. See Ryngaert, supra note 18, at 3-4. 
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 Stephens, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
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occurred and furthermore the home States of the multinational corporations. Thus 
jurisdictional concerns arise when the MNC commits violations in a host State. To deal with 
such implications and corporate accountability, international law as well as domestic law 
provides for remedies. Supplementary to these are regional bodies and instruments that offer 
voluntary policies and mechanisms. State responsibility can be placed in the domicile of the 
MNC or the host State, the feasibility of such an inclination will be discussed. It is possible 
that the future could produce an option whereby corporate liability could be asserted directly 
under international law, however at present such an option does not exist. Voluntary 
instruments are also important means to promote human rights since corporations can adapt 
the norms to their individual corporate structure.
32
 
Corporations can directly violate human rights abroad or indirectly participate by investing in 
countries that directly violate the rights. Part of the legals difficulties is that military regimes 
may commit the atrocities without the direct involvement from the companies. While direct 
involvement can be the direct perpetration of the acts or ordering atrocities, indirect 
participation can be the employment of other actors. Oftentimes corporations do not commit 
the actual act, but rather allow violations to occur by adhering to detrimental governmental 
policies, failing to prevent abuses or passively condone the actions by remaining 
silent.
33
Corporate entities can also assist governmental bodies in the violations.
34
 The 
corporation can perform State-like undertakings, by delegation or governmental functions.
35
 
These corporations and their representatives acting as pseudo governmental agencies can be 
afforded State immunity, thereby shielding them from prosecution.
36
  
 
2.3.1 Home and host State responsibility 
Multinational corporations possess great economic power due to their size and wealth. The 
corporations can, and oftentimes will, exert control over recipient investment countries, also 
labeled host States. This renders corporations the position to ensure adherence to human 
rights norms. What is commonly referred to as the home State of global corporations can be 
derived from the location of the headquarters, parent company or some other establishment 
that has residency in the host nation. The increased number of transactions between host 
States and non-state actors, such as MNCs, has been enabled by globalization which has 
                                                          
32 A further tool is to create incentives for responsible conduct. It is possible for large organizations, such as the 
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not be discussed any further.  See Olivier De Schutter, Transnational Corporations and Human Rights: An 
Introduction, Global Law Working Paper 01/05, at 13 (2005). Available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/global/workingpapers/2005/ECM_DLV_015787.  
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 Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law: Where from 
Here?, 19 Connecticut Journal of International Law 51, 4 (2003). 
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Andrew J Wilson, Beyond Unocal: Conceptual Problems in Using International Norms to Hold Transnational 
Corporations Liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, in Olivier De Shutter (ed), Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford Hart Publishing, 55 (2006). 
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 Wilson supra note 34, at 59. 
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created bonds between the developing countries and the developed countries.
 37
 The creation 
of influential global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF), has enlarged the transactions taking place around the 
world. The liberalization of trade has enabled companies to utilize resources and cheap labor 
in developing countries. These factors have enabled substantial profits and growth both for 
the MNC and the host State and as a result of this interdependence enabled the MNC to gain 
immense influence in the host State.
38
 
The conduct abroad of MNCs is at present not governed by any international body. There are 
several guidelines and recommendations, all in essence voluntary or non-binding legal 
instruments.
39
 Corporations have brought several benefits to impoverished countries, such as 
closing the knowledge gap, allowing for the transfer of technology, providing training of 
human resources and opening access to international markets.
40
 Developing countries can 
benefit from economic relations through investment where the infrastructure and other social 
indicators are enhanced, as well as providing revenue for governments and creating jobs. The 
host government wants to attract foreign direct investment, often by offering cheap labor and 
natural resources to MNCs.  The incentive of MNC investment is the hope of gaining wealth 
in developing countries. Factors that attract large corporations are resources, raw material, 
land, cheap labor and military protection from the government.
41
 Unfortunately the latter also 
includes regimes that disregard human rights.  
By taking advantage of local legal systems that are not or ill adapted to efficient corporate 
regulation, enterprises can move to production sites and steer investment to locations where 
the national and regional laws are more hospitable. The relations of power between the MNC 
and the developing country may grant the corporation significant impact on human rights law. 
MNCs can influence the contracting parties of the country to abide and respect international 
law with the power of deciding the recipient country of investment. MNCs may also choose to 
opt out of countries that commit human rights violations. The economic power wielded by the 
                                                          
37 Claudia T. Salazar, Applying International Human Rights Norms in the United States: Holding Multinational 
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 Salazar, supra note 37, at 145-146.  
40 Joseph Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal 
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(2007-2008). 
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MNCs allow for control over development policy which has not always proved beneficial 
from the social standpoint of the host State. 
 
2.3.2 The developing role of home States and government power 
The home State can also prove to be a pivotal player in the MNC‟s decision to invest in a 
particular host State. The governments of the home States in effect engage themselves in 
brokering favorable terms for the MNC‟s perspective investment while also furthering their 
own political agenda. Particular MNCs co-operate with their own government to ensure better 
terms with a developing country. Aid-dependent countries are in a weak position to negotiate 
due to their need for monetary assistance. Developing nations with their smaller economies 
are also in an unfavorable position against home States with significantly larger resources. 
These factors lead to inequitable conditions as small host States in practice have no 
negotiating power. The agreements between the two nations are often imbalanced where no 
lobbyist or legal counsel can represent the interests of the host State.
42
 The core issue is that 
impoverished nations are not given the flexibility to negotiate the terms of investment. In 
particular US corporations are significantly supported by the strong US government.
43
 MNCs 
can gain special tax or regulatory treatment, while the host States‟ officials are more 
susceptible to corruption due to low salaries and poor governmental funding.
44
 The joint 
power of the home State and the MNC, results in the enterprise ultimately dictating the terms 
under which it is willing to invest. 
From a legal standpoint, underdeveloped countries face difficulties in regulating the conduct 
of MNCs. Fear of losing investment can result in the acquittal of violators, as well as allowing 
and maintaining lenient laws and standards of production and working conditions. It also 
appears unlikely for host States to become involved in litigation that is costly and will deter 
future investment.
45
 On one hand, host States are not willing to regulate the activities of 
MNCs as it is undesirable, and on the other hand it can be impossible due to legal obstacles 
and lack of enforcement. Impoverished nations often need the foreign investment and do not 
want to induce corporations to relocate to other, more hospitable countries.  
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2 REGULATION OF CORPORATE ACTIVITIES 
 
3.1 Self-regulation of multinational corporations 
During the 20
th
 century global firms altered both the extent and the nature of the corporate 
structure. Firms consistently seek to reduce costs and increase strategic flexibility by 
outsourcing activities that do not belong to the core of its business. The alteration of business 
networks affects the supply chain. Companies maintain economic control over the supply 
chains, yet outsourcing also concedes legal obligations for economical, social and 
environmental impacts to move from the company to suppliers.
46
 These developments raise 
issues about the boundaries of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and thus the extent to 
which the companies can be responsible for the activities of suppliers. Customer firms are 
responsible for purchased products or services, however not legally responsible for the 
activities of the suppliers. The supplier is subject to local laws. MNCs employing this 
structure often depend on their brand name for sales, thus poor social performance in the 
supply chain may damage the reputation of the company.
47
 These circumstances encourage 
MNCs to contract with suppliers that respect and abide to human rights norms.
48
  
Self-regulation is a useful and flexible tool that allows standards to be coupled with each 
corporation. MNCs tend to prefer such an approach as it can benefit the corporate structure 
and promote marketing efforts as well as the utilization of codes of conduct. Multinational 
corporations may have intricate corporate structures where one single approach may not be 
feasible. Therefore the levels to which self regulation is implemented can be adaptable to each 
industry sector and area of business and provide an internal alternative to legally binding 
instruments. However consideration must be given to whether self-regulation is an efficient 
tool as corporate codes often have no monitoring or enforcement mechanism. 
 
3.2 Corporate codes of conduct  
By the 1970s corporate codes of conduct passed by international organizations became rather 
common with the attempts of complying with international law norms. Several instruments 
have been initiated, such as the UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations in the 
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1980s, yet were not adopted due to enforceability and monitoring difficulties.  To this date no 
legally binding international code applying directly to MNCs has proved sustainable. The 
impediment of signing a treaty with binding norms rests with the lack of consensus to norms 
that the majority is willing to abide to. Corporate codes of conduct prevailed from the 
response to criticism from the general public, media and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). In spite of several attempts, the establishment of codes has not fully been realized. 
Numerous corporate codes do not bear the threat of sanctions nor are they enforced 
frequently. The codes seldom require an independent monitoring body to ensure 
compliance.
49
 The incentive for MNCs to implement such codes is not particularly persuasive. 
Corporations can fear a disadvantage if other MNCs do not sign comparable codes. The loss 
of profit may result from the loss of contracts with developing countries. Since a principal 
objective of the corporation is shareholder profits, a decision to implement a code of conduct 
may not be prioritized.
50
 
 
3.3 Corporate Social Responsibility  
Globalization has had dramatic effects on developing countries. Prospective investment and 
economic growth will continue to have social and environmental impacts. Corporate Social 
Responsibility is a term applied to describe the role of business in developing countries and 
can be viewed together with terms such as business ethics, corporate citizenship, corporate 
sustainability or stakeholder management.
51
 No general standard description of the concept is 
employed. Only recently have corporations initiated rather noteworthy evidence of CSR in the 
strategic management and stakeholder social reporting.
52
 The responsibility is often 
communicated towards employees and stakeholders affected by the decisions of the 
company.
53
 
The inherent problematic aspect of codes of conduct in the area of CSR is that there is a broad 
diversity in the codes. Different standards and verification mechanisms make it hard to 
compare corporations, or even appreciate the achievements of the specific code. It also makes 
it difficult to interpret whether a code is credible or not, especially for consumers.
54
 While 
CSR and other voluntary initiatives by MNCs can affect human rights norms, it has proved 
that voluntary instruments do not currently benefit the victims of gross violations. 
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4 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
International law is limited in its powers to enforce punitive actions when confronted with 
corporate actors evading responsibility and legal accountability.  This is because it does not 
directly address MNCs, nor can hold individual nations responsible for MNCs‟ conduct 
abroad. States are under the obligation to respect human rights, either as contracting parties to 
a treaty, customary international law or norms of peremptory character (erga omnes). States 
are parties to Conventions and other instruments on the international scene, and are ultimately 
accountable for compliance to norms. All members of society, i.e. individuals as well as the 
private business sector, have responsibilities and must abide to the regulations that are 
indirectly imposed on them through the acts of the Contracting Parties. States are required to 
implement human rights obligations to the domestic level by the imposition of duties and 
responsibility to all actors within their jurisdiction.
55
 Treaties can specifically require States to 
adopt measures that will prohibit organizations or corporate entities to commit violations. 
Thus any improper conduct by an MNC that results in abuses is considered a violation by the 
State of its international obligations.
56
 Various Conventions apply to human rights norms. 
These apply to the States which are party to the specific agreement, but can be also be 
considered valid claims as evidence of customary international law that applies regardless of 
being party to the Convention. Treaties that have not entered in to force or have no 
enforcement capacity for the reason that no consensus can be achieved, can still be evidence 
of opinio juris or State practice. In general, States cannot be held responsible for the acts of 
private parties‟ conduct abroad. Similarly individuals not acting under the instructions or 
under the direction or control of the State cannot have their actions attributed to the State.
57
  
In the legal setting efforts to restrain and control corporate power operate on two levels. The 
first level attempts to regulate MNCs through universal standards. These efforts endeavor to 
apply above and beyond local regulations. The attempts at this level include efforts in global 
and regional bodies, such as the United Nations, OECD and European Union. The efforts 
consist of standards of operations and can include monitoring, assessment and necessary 
enforcement. The first level also includes activists, such as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that engage and mobilize developed legal systems to battle corrupt corporate practice. 
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The second level of legal setting is the direct involvement of State regulation, such as the 
ATCA.  
Important actors on the international level include the United Nations and the OECD. There 
have been several international initiatives to create an instrument that imposes direct 
obligations on corporations, such as the Draft set of Norms on the Human Rights 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. Yet due to 
lack of consensus among nations, there is currently no binding instrument.
58
  
 
4.1 The United Nations human rights norms for businesses 
By the 1940s and 1950s the structure of international law was changing due to the experiences 
of the Second World War. Among the initial undertakings was the establishment of the United 
Nations with the goal of ensuring respect of human rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) was declared to apply on States, individuals and all organs of 
society.
59
 The accountability has developed from States to include individuals and also non-
state actors. The Declaration provides universal rights to be adhered to and respected by the 
participating States, NGOs and corporations. However, corporate accountability under 
international law is highly uncertain and widely debated upon. In 1974 the UN Commission 
of Transnational Corporations was established, with the task of drafting a general code of 
conduct whose main focus was issues of international trade. The work was however ended by 
1992 and the Draft Code was not adopted because of disagreements between the countries.
60
 
Voluntary codes have been the preferred choice for corporations and countries since the 
1970s. The idea to invoke legal international responsibilities did not emerge until the 1990s. 
The UN set out in 1997 to create a draft on corporate liability which was completed in 2004. 
The document, the UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
61
, was however not adopted.
62
 
The draft‟s task was to recognize the effects of TNCs on human rights and to make 
recommendations.
63
 The articles consisted of human rights standards in areas on humanitarian 
law, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as consumer protection and 
environmental practices. Part of the controversy was the non-voluntary character of the norms 
which differed from previous voluntary efforts. It included mechanisms of reporting, 
monitoring and verification. An approval from the UN bodies would have inclined the 
instrument to have a legal standing, even if considered soft law it could be interpreted as 
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current international customs. Nevertheless, the UN Commission on Human Rights declared 
in 2004 that although it is an important instrument, the norms have no legal standing.
64
 
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General at the time, initiated the Global Compact to regulate 
conduct between the United Nations and the private sector. The Global Compact was 
launched on July 26, 2000 as a voluntary instrument to co-operate with corporations and civil 
society. The instrument contains ten principles that derive from the UDHR, the Declaration of 
the International Labor Organization on Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, the Rio 
Declaration of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) 
and UN Convention Against Corruption.
65
 The principles contain instructions to promote 
human rights, improve labor conditions, protection of the environment and transparency.
66
 In 
2004 anti-corruption values were added. The principles regarding human rights are: 
- Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed 
human rights within their sphere of influence;
67
 and,  
- Make sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses.68 
 
The Global Compact is based on voluntary efforts and annual reports on initiatives taken to 
adhere to the ten principles. The instruments, some voluntary and others not in force, indicate 
that there have been efforts to gather an international endorsement to corporate responsibility. 
The lack of a successful or binding legal mechanism is rather palpable at this stage since no 
legal consensus has been achieved from the 1970s. While the drafts and instruments can 
provide for evidence of State practice, their significance and influence are debated to this 
date.  
 
4.2 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
During the 1970s and 1980s other voluntary codes were promoted by regional governmental 
organizations. These were often industry-specific codes or focusing on specific issues.
69
 The 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), one of the main 
influencing organizations, issued in 1976 the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The 
OECD guideline was adopted in 1976 by the Member States.
70
 The guidelines are 
recommendations partly overlapping with the UN Global Compact, but also include aspects of 
information, consumer interest, science, technology, anti-trust and taxation. The Guidelines 
were revised in 2000 and constitute propositions aimed at enterprises of the Member States. 
They contain the policy that enterprises should respect human rights of those affected by the 
corporation‟s activities and should be consistent with the host government‟s international 
obligations and commitments.
71
 This implies that not only local regulations of the host State 
should be considered, but also international obligations, especially if these norms declare 
more expansive responsibility.
72
 
The revision in 2000 also expanded the focus on the National Contact Points (NPC) that 
promote the guidelines, handle enquiries and assist in its implementation when problems 
emerge.
73
 If violations occur, either in a third State or in the territory of the Member State, the 
NPC may receive complaints.
74
 When no agreement is reached on the national level, the NPC 
must after the revision issue a statement that identifies the violating corporation unless 
considerations of the interests of the implementation of the Guidelines require other 
measures.
75
 Although this complaints mechanism can deter corporate conduct that violates 
human rights by acclaiming public interest, the compliance with the guidelines is voluntary 
and there is no enforcement procedure provided. The Guidelines still constitute the most 
widely used instrument on the international level.
 76
 The European Commission has further 
stated that the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are setting universally 
applicable standards for MNEs from industrialized countries and should also apply above any 
code from the EU.
77
 This is in line with other statements from the EU related to corporate 
responsibility.
78
  By promoting the OECD Guidelines, the consistency of the norms will 
further promote corporate uniformity in the global setting.  
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5 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
The Member States of the European Union appoint common laws and regulations that apply 
to all the Members, yet not all areas are covered by the EU. Certain aspects are still 
independently governed by the Member State alone, some are voluntary and other 
implemented in separate manners and differing from nation to nation. To this date individual 
Member States regulate the conduct of corporations registered in a specific nation. Within the 
European Union (EU) several mechanisms have been initiated to expand the responsibility of 
enterprises. The mechanisms mainly evolve around voluntary corporate codes, often 
developed by international organizations or by the enterprise independently.
79
 The European 
Parliament intends to promote voluntary initiatives by MNCs and encourage the existing 
international instruments from the OECD and UN.
80
 The European countries implement 
international legal obligations in different manners, some countries apply both criminal and 
civil law and other countries refer directly to international law provisions in the domestic 
legislation.
81
 The free movement of capital and investments in the EU denotes that Member 
States experience increased competition on the regulation of corporate conduct and States 
seek to attract investment from other Member States.
 82
 Corporations can move from one 
jurisdiction to another with more favourable regulations. This increased competition may 
have generated reluctance from the governments of Member States to impose strict 
requirements on MNCs. This may also be the reason why voluntary instruments have been 
promoted by the EU.  
Apart from these voluntary instruments and corporate codes, the EU has also regulated how 
claims of human rights abuses by EU corporations will be heard. In Regulation No 44/2001 
the EU recognizes the jurisdiction of Member States to hear tort claims resulting from MNC 
conduct abroad.
83
 Member States can hear human rights claims suffered by victims, 
irrespective of nationality, when damage is caused by the activities of a MNC or any of its 
branches domiciled in a Member State. The residence of a corporation decides where 
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litigation takes place and the regulations it needs to abide to.
 84
 The possibilities to hold an 
MNC domiciled in a Member State of the EU will depend on the nature of the links between 
the conduct and the corporation, whether it is a branch, agency, subsidiary or an autonomous 
entity that has a certain degree of independence and control.
85
 The recognition of these links 
will affect whether the MNC can be held accountable for human rights violations committed 
abroad.
86
 
 
5.1 Human rights norms in the European Union 
The implication of EU regulations is important since Member States have several parent 
companies with corporate links abroad and are second to the US in number.
87
 The European 
Court of Human Rights enforces the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) but 
does not extend its jurisdiction to MNCs.
88
 The Convention was adopted by the Council of 
Europe and signed by all EU Member States since all are members of the Council.
89
 The 
Court bears jurisdiction to hear allegations of violations of the Convention. The Court can 
only hear claims by victims of human rights abuses and cases can only be brought against 
States.
90
 The ECHR distinguishes from public international law by imposing on the 
Contracting States the obligation to prevent infringements committed by private parties.
91
  
Despite this the State Parties of the Convention do not have an obligation to protect the 
fundamental rights of individuals affected by human rights violations but living outside the 
jurisdiction of the court.
92
 Even if the Convention is far-reaching compared to other regional 
or international instruments, it still does not impose obligations on enterprises operating on a 
transnational scene.
93
 The State Parties to the Convention are required to control private 
individuals and their conduct under their jurisdiction, but it is limited to that jurisdiction. 
Foreign claimants cannot thus impose MNC accountability through the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
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  The instrument and Contracting States can be found at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+protocols/The+Europ
ean+Convention+on+Human+Rights/ [Last visited on 03.10.2009 10:11]. 
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5.2 Corporations in Sweden 
The government of Sweden has chosen to promote good corporate conduct through self-
regulation and more importantly by the adherence to international regulations by the OECD 
and UN. This will accordingly promote the international competitiveness of Swedish 
enterprises. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Sweden is responsible for the Swedish 
Partnership for Global Responsibility. Corporations can voluntarily join the Partnership and 
through the network gain an understanding of the international norms and how they can be 
implemented on a practical level. The Partnership was initiated by the Swedish government in 
March 2002 to promote human rights, basic employment standards, better environmental 
standards and anti-corruption measures by Swedish corporations. The Partnership provides a 
forum that promotes social responsibility between corporate actors, the government and other 
organs of society. The aim of the Partnership is to increase the competitiveness of Swedish 
enterprises, to commit to human rights and sustainable development as well as expanding the 
knowledge of international regulations.
94
 The foundation of the Partnership is the OECD 
Guidelines as well as the UN Global Compact. Swedish enterprises are encouraged to 
promote CSR by adhering to the policies of the UN Global Compact.
95
 The Swedish 
government also participates by promoting the OECD Guidelines through the National 
Contact Points of the OECD.
96
 The NPC in Sweden are composed of representatives from 
several departments of the Government Offices of Sweden as well as representatives from 
trade and labor unions, industry and trade sector.
97
  
The Swedish Corporate Governance Board promotes good corporate governance by self-
regulation directed in the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance.
98
 The main principle of 
“comply or explain” promotes socially responsible behavior. In the annual corporate 
governance report companies are obliged to exhibit their compliance with the Code or if a rule 
is inappropriate in a particular circumstance, the corporation may choose to explain its 
position and reasons for applying other solutions. Companies obliged to follow the Code are 
private companies listed on the Swedish securities market.
99
 The task of the Board of 
Directors includes having the company comply with laws and regulations relevant to the 
operation, as well as define guidelines to govern the company‟s ethical conduct.100 The 
Swedish government has declared its intention to abide to norms of the OECD and UN, thus 
listed corporations on the Swedish securities market are obliged to follow the international 
norms. 
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 For more about the Swedish Partnership for Global Responsibility see: 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2657/a/14557 [Last visited on 18.01.10]. 
95
 For a list of enterprises that have joined the Partnership see: 
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6 UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
 
6.1 The divide between criminal and civil jurisdiction 
Countries need to respect and abstain from interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries as States are considered equal and sovereign.
101
  Matters that fall within the scope of 
the internal affairs are decided by State practice and the development of international 
relations. The universality principle states that regardless of where an action takes place 
certain crimes are of international interest and affect all nations worldwide. Jus cogens crimes 
can be considered to be of an erga omnes obligation. Crimes of universal character can be 
prosecuted by the international community, diverse international courts and tribunals or by a 
foreign State. However it does impose jurisdictional concerns.
102
 The concept of jurisdiction 
is essential in the discussion of human rights remedies. Since no explicit prohibition has been 
maintained, universal jurisdiction has been considered permitted under international law.
103
 
While international law mainly focuses on criminal law, this argument has been widely used 
by scholars to argue for and against universal jurisdiction both in criminal and civil matters. 
There is no international consensus at this stage.
104
 International law authorizes criminal 
jurisdiction in a number of Conventions, yet there is no instrument granting civil 
jurisdiction.
105
 Both customary international law and treaties provide universal jurisdiction on 
certain acts. 
The most common source of jurisdiction is territorial and accordingly the State has the right to 
deal with implications within its borders.
106
 A further common source is the active personality 
principle where nationals‟ actions committed abroad can be valid claims for a State to assert 
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 See Charter of the United Nations art. 2 § 7. 
102 State immunity is also an important concern but will not be further discussed. Gillian D. Triggs, International 
Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 348-349, at 361-363, 2006. 
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 The Lotus case provides that States can acclaim jurisdiction unless explicitly prohibited by international law; 
SS Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ (Series A) No 10.  
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in the field of human rights, both that jurisdictional matters can be extensive for the purpose of ensuring human 
rights, but also that is it difficult to obtain consensus on an international level, Ryngaert, supra note 18, at 21-23. 
106
 States cannot exercise jurisdiction over another State‟s territory unless international rules provides for an 
exception (State sovereignty). Jurisdiction can be claimed on the basis of nationality and territory as well as 
sufficient links to either of these underpinnings. See: Triggs, supra note 101, at 356-357. 
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jurisdiction. International law also grants States passive personality jurisdiction where crimes 
are committed against its nationals abroad.
107
 The principle of universality provides 
jurisdiction on the nature of the offence or violation, the idea that certain crimes are egregious 
in nature and it provides States the right to deal with such infringements. The principle is 
often invoked under criminal law. Universal jurisdiction allows courts to hear serious 
infringements of international law, usually gross human rights violations irrespective of where 
the events occurred. This category of jurisdiction does not require any territorial or personal 
nexus to the forum State, but rather the nature of a particular violation determines its 
universality. In practice the universality principle under tort cases will ordinarily establish 
certain minimal territorial links to the forum. This does not require the defendants to reside in 
or be a national of the forum State, transient presence can suffice depending on the particular 
circumstances of the case.
108
 
Several domestic legislations have asserted universal jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions on 
human rights violations.
109
 Most jurisdictions have in such cases referred to the Geneva 
Conventions or Convention Against Torture.
110
 It appears that the federal courts of the US and 
the universal tort jurisdiction are distinct from other countries of the world.
111
 State practice 
outside the US remains scarce and currently there is no European jurisdiction similar to the 
ATCA, that offers civil remedy with the objective to provide compensation to victims of 
human rights violations abroad. European civil law does not codify universal tort jurisdiction 
and at present the US is the only country in the world to do so.
112
 
There are also at present no binding customs or law, nor any effective remedy available to 
deal with the implication of MNCs on the international arena. Only a few countries have 
enacted legislation to deal with this problem and only an assortment based on the theory of 
universal jurisdiction. Under the universality principle, and thus only covering gross 
violations of human rights, the US federal courts can deal with tort litigation on actions 
committed abroad. There is no international consensus on whether international law requires 
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 Kaleck, supra note 81, at 964-965. 
108
 Ryngaert, supra note 18, at 3.  
109 Among the more noted are the Belgian courts that have charged crimes against humanity based on customary 
international law. The case against Pinochet is perhaps the most noted case in Europe, R v Bow Street 
Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147; 119 ILR 135, 200. See Stephens, 
supra note, 6, at 43.  
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home States of MNCs to prevent abuses of human rights committed outside the jurisdiction of 
the US.
113
 
 
6.2 Jurisdiction in the United States 
In the United States two statutes provide federal courts the jurisdiction to hear claims for 
violations of international law.
114
 The Alien Tort Claims Act from 1789 as well as the Torture 
Victim Protection Act (TVPA) of 1991 provide a cause of action.
115
 The TVPA was more 
recently enacted to codify some of the case law as a response to the ATCA. The Act brought 
some clarification to the ATCA on the cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing 
committed by a government official.
116
 It grants both aliens as well as US citizens the right to 
prosecute. The most successful and extensive legislature is the ATCA, however it is not 
formally based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.
117
 The ATCA asserts federal 
jurisdiction on international law and treaties. Traditionally, international law violations 
required the involvement of State action. However, recent developments have changed this. 
Federal courts of the US hear atrocities committed on foreign soil by private actors. The 
American legal system can in this perspective be seen as groundbreaking by introducing such 
legal remedies.  
US courts that hear claims filed by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign defendant that relate to 
torts committed abroad, can in effect be considered based on universal jurisdiction.
118
 The US 
federal courts in general do not confer to the ATCA as an act that grants universal 
jurisdiction. On the other hand the link to the US arises from corporate conduct, in practice 
often responsibility of the parent company. The US Supreme Court argues in their sole 
decision concerning the ATCA under Sosa, which does not discuss it in terms of universal tort 
jurisdiction that the ATCA provides for jurisdiction on norms comparable to the paradigms of 
1789. Universal jurisdiction under customary international law authorizes the ability to take 
action under jus cogens norms. The US Supreme Court has not asserted the substantive norms 
actionable under the Act. Only gross violations of human rights are actions that appear to be 
jus cogens norms. Customary international law provides that all States may exercise universal 
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture.
119
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 Sende, supra note 55, at 38. 
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 Civil suits for victims of international terrorism is another act that can be of interest, The Anti-Terrorism Act 
under 18 USC § 2333 (1990). See Stephens, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
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6.2.1 US jurisdiction over multinational corporations 
For the ATCA to be applicable, personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation is 
required.
120
 The federal courts of the US interpret the Act as providing jurisdiction over 
enterprises either incorporated in the US or having a continuous business relationship with the 
US. The US courts cannot obtain jurisdiction over an individual or corporation that is not 
within the borders of the US and do not have sufficient links to the country. Victims and 
foreigners can seek damages to violations of international law, either by those who have 
committed the violations or are complicit in such actions. For a parent company to be held 
liable it is required that they are either a direct participant in the violations or subject to 
vicarious liability.
121
 
 
6.3 Universal jurisdiction in the European Union 
Jurisdiction in the EU is explicitly governed in Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters.
122
 The provisions assert jurisdiction of the Member States to hear tort claims, 
irrespective of the nationality of the victim, based on the domicile of the company or any of 
its branches. The Regulation provides that the general principle of jurisdiction in the EU is 
exercised by the Member State of the defendant‟s domicile. A tort claim can be heard under 
two grounds of jurisdiction, in courts where the event occurred or may occur, as well as on 
disputes arising out of the operations of the company and thus the place where the injury 
resulted.
123
 The Regulation has been interpreted as covering both the damage where the event 
took place, as well as the place giving rise to the event.
124
 From this, it follows that the place 
where the decision is adopted or taken by the board of directors, can be in a Member State 
other than where the company is domiciled. The action can be lodged in the State where the 
parent company is domiciled or where a branch, an agency or other establishment of the 
company has been the source of damage. Therefore, if harm results from the operations of a 
branch, the parent company can be sued in the State where the branch is located.
125
 The 
domicile is determined in accordance with the domestic law of the Member State where the 
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 Stephens, supra note 3, at 8. 
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action is brought.
126
 For legal persons and firms the domicile is determined by the country 
where the statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business is located.
127
 
 
In May 2002, the European Parliament called on the European Commission to create a study 
of the application in court, of the extraterritoriality principle provided in Regulation 44/2001 
and encouraged the incorporation of the principle in domestic legislation.
128
 Whether this will 
develop in the Member States remains to be seen. The ATCA and the potential use of the 
Regulation, differ in certain aspects. While the ATCA references to violations of the law of 
nations and thus universal norms of international law, the EU would employ lex loci delicti, 
i.e. the law of the jurisdiction where the event took place. The applicable law will thus depend 
on the liability claim. In practice most cases will render national laws that in turn identifies 
with international human rights law, yet the reference to lex loci delicti may cause difficulties 
if the law provides insufficient protection of the victims.
129
 On the other hand, it is possible 
that the principle provides that the forum State law will be employed considering cases where 
the parent company has exercised insufficient control over a subsidiary operating abroad. In 
such a case, even if the damages resulted abroad, the duty of the parent company provides that 
the forum State, i.e. where the company is domiciled, will provide for the applicable law.
130
  
 
6.3.1 EU jurisdiction over multinational corporations 
Member States of the EU can hear tort claims on damage suffered by victims, regardless of 
their nationality. Claims can be brought to the domicile of the corporation or the State where 
any branch is located and has sufficient links to the act causing the damage.
131
 If there is a 
territorial nexus to a European State, it is possible to file for a suit in the nation where the 
corporation is registered. However, without a territorial or personal nexus to the forum State, 
jurisdiction similar to universal tort jurisdiction, is not applicable.
132
 In general tort claims 
will be considered on the basis of the law of the jurisdiction where the event took place, lex 
loci delicti. From this it follows that the possibilities to hear claims of international law, both 
customary law and other norms, is limited.  
The Regulation has not been widely employed in the EU and the principle providing for such 
jurisdiction has not been incorporated to any greater extent by the Member States.
133
 Even 
when it is possible to assert jurisdiction for lawsuits in the EU, procedural rules and cultural 
attitudes in some legal systems towards civil litigation may render it difficult to assert claims. 
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Even the English legal system that is comparable to the US system, is renowned for 
denouncing universal tort jurisdiction under international law.
134
 There is however a potential 
field of future litigation. The European States provide for criminal redress to a greater extent 
than the US, which can explain why civil redress is a limited option in the EU.
135
 This can be 
considered to be the alternative to civil redress similar to the ATCA. The US may focus on 
civil redress, while the EU has universal criminal jurisdiction.
136
 
                                                          
134 An option could be to combine criminal proceeding with civil action in the EU Member States, but in such a 
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7 CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN 
TORT CLAIMS ACT 
 
 
The development of cases leading up to the establishment of corporate accountability has 
been rapid, however human rights litigation in the US has experienced shifts and turns. The 
Alien Tort Claims Act derives from the Judiciary Act of 1789. The first landmark case where 
the ATCA was applied was the 1980 case of Filartaga v. Peña-Irala, prior to which the use of 
ATCA was uncommon in human rights lawsuits.
137
 During the 1980s most of the suits 
concerned foreign nationals suing their own government thus entailing State action. By the 
1990s the litigation expanded to private actors to include suits against MNCs alleged of aiding 
and abetting in human rights violations by foreign States. In subsequent years federal courts 
have been occupied with deciding the norms considered to be a breach of the law of nations 
and thus also part of federal common law. It was not until the Kadic v. Karadzic case that 
courts found private actors liable for human rights violations.
138
 After this decision corporate 
cases began to emerge.
139
 Doe v. Unocal Corp. was the first lawsuit concerning a private 
corporation.
140
  Only on one occasion has the US Supreme Court addressed the ATCA which 
was not until the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain decision in 2004.
141
 However that case also left 
several key issues unresolved. As a result Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has been noted both for its 
use as a reference and guide, as well as a lack thereof. 
The number of court cases heard is a small fraction when compared to the number of lawsuits 
filed. This is due to the difficulty in assigning responsibility to corporations when they rarely 
commit direct acts of human rights abuse. As a result the most important question that has 
developed under the ATCA is whether corporations can be held accountable for aiding and 
abetting (complicity) in human rights abuses. It has proved difficult to gain personal 
jurisdiction over individual human rights violators yet legal action on corporations based in 
the US has resulted in more successful outcomes than in other countries.142 The cases leading 
to the establishment of corporate responsibility have developed from the acts of States, 
individual accountability and international criminal norms as the following cases will portray. 
However as the litigation of court cases indicate, several obstacles remain when attributing 
corporate accountability to global firms. These obstacles involve various parties including the 
political branch, NGOs and other actors.  
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7.1 The Alien Tort Claims Act 
The Judiciary Act was one of the first laws in the US.
143
 It was enacted in 1789 and is now 
codified in 28 USC § 1350.
144
  
 
 
̏ The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States. ̋
 
The Statute provides for civil redress to victims of human rights abuses and jurisdiction under 
international law.
145
 Since no significant sources are available to interpret the legislative intent 
of the First Congress, the original meaning of the Statute is debated upon.
146
 There are several 
theories on the primary intent from the drafters, but under the generally accepted history of 
the ATCA there are three principal offenses under the law of nations. The US can claim 
national interest in the following three offenses; violations of safe conduct, infringements of 
the rights of ambassadors and piracy on the high seas.147 After its enactment the Statute was 
rarely invoked for nearly 200 years.
148
 The federal courts have struggled with the application 
of the ATCA because of its ambiguous nature. The Statute does not grant a cause of action to 
aggrieved individuals, instead it grants jurisdiction over torts committed in violation of the 
law of nations. The 1789 case Bolchos v. Darrell considered disputes of seized ships, property 
rights and slaves that were seized as prizes in times of war. 149 Since the Filartiga v. Peña-
Irala decision in 1980 the ATCA has commonly served as a human rights statute granting 
subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts.150 The Statute has commonly been employed by 
human rights advocates to bring violators from foreign countries to justice. The plaintiff must 
find a cause of action in customary international law, yet in practice these same international 
laws are often controversial and ambiguous.
151
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7.2 The requirement of State action under Filartiga 
In 1976 in Asuncion, Paraguay, 17-year old Joelito Filartiga was kidnapped and tortured to 
death by Americo Norberto Pena-Irala. At the time, Pena-Irala was Inspector General of 
Police and it was believed that the torture took place as revenge due to the political beliefs of 
Filartiga‟s father. The family of Filartiga tried to bring the case to court in Paraguay but was 
unsuccessful. Later in 1978 as the family moved to New York, USA, they filed a suit in the 
Eastern District of New York as Pena-Irala arrived in the US. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was first 
dismissed on lack of jurisdiction.
152
 The first court found that a law governing the treatment 
of citizens by a sovereign State was not a violation of the law of nations. Yet the appeal in the 
Second Circuit resulted in a granting of federal jurisdiction and cause of action and thus 
reversing the dismissal. The Filartiga family was entitled compensation and punitive damages 
as the court declared that international law prohibits official torture.
153
 
The landmark case of Filartiga opened up litigation for breaches of customary international 
law made by State officers.
154
 In the case, the court relied on a wide range of sources on the 
evidence of torture. The violation of the law of nations and torture was found in the UN 
Charter, UDHR, State pronouncements, foreign constitutions and other treaties not yet ratified 
by the US. Later cases have relied to a lesser extent on State pronouncements and instead 
turned to actual State practice.
155
 One definition states that customary international law results 
from a general and consistent practice of States following them from a sense of legal 
obligation.
156
 In customary international law the norms are principally only applicable where 
governmental action is involved.
157
 In order for the ATCA to be applicable on private actors 
based on norms that require State action, some joint responsibility or sufficient connection is 
needed for the State and private actor.  The federal courts of the US have used different tests 
to determine the requirement of State action.
158
  
The tests include traditional State functions and participation in partnerships. It can be single 
events or longer relationships and indirect liability.
159
 The nexus test (1) demands a close 
affiliation between the State and the alleged conduct. The public function test (2) is applicable 
to an entity that performs a function that traditionally belongs to the sphere of the State. The 
symbiotic relationship test (3) may be utilized where the State has insinuated itself to a 
position of interdependence with a private actor so that it can be recognized as a close 
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relationship.
160
 An individual that willfully participates in joint action with the State or its 
agents can meet the joint action test (4). Corporations that perform no State-like function or 
present no connection with a government are not within the range of norms of this character. 
It is thus vital to assert the specific requirements to the applicable norms.  
 
7.3 Kadic v Karadzic and private actors 
The court in Kadic v. Karadzic found that individuals acting in their private capacity can be 
responsible under the law of nations, as long as the conduct occurs under the authority of the 
color of state or violates a norm of international law that recognizes private parties as an actor 
under that norm.
161
 In the case of Kadic the leader of Srpska Republic, self-proclaimed and 
located within Bosnia-Herzegovina, was alleged of torture, rape and murder for a campaign 
on genocide performed by the Serbian military on the order of Karadzic. The case was 
dismissed by the Southern District of New York by finding that private actors cannot violate 
the law of nations. Yet on appeal the Second Circuit reversed the decision as individuals can 
be liable for certain violations of international law. The Court concluded that jus cogens 
norms cannot be disregarded by States or private individuals. However, as stated in the 
Filartiga case, torture can only be violated by State officers or actions under the color of law 
as found under customary international law.
162
 The Court thus found that Karadzic was liable 
even if he was not a State officer.
163
  
 
7.3.1 Non-state actors and the violation of jus cogens norms 
Present treaties and Conventions acknowledge that individuals may be held accountable to 
violations of jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms are defined as norms that are absolute and 
allow no deviation.
164
 Among the recognized jus cogens norms by federal courts are 
prohibitions of acts against piracy, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and 
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slavery.
165
 The Unocal case also added forced labor as a modern equivalent of slavery.
166
 
MNCs may also be liable for violations of customary international law in furtherance of any 
jus cogens norm. 
 
7.3.2 Obligations under international criminal law - the Nuremberg trials  
To establish accountability the federal courts of the US require authorization from 
international law. The Nuremberg criminal tribunals held non-state actors accountable to 
violations of international human rights. The prosecutions were some of the early cases 
addressing individual responsibility under international law since preceding cases considered 
States the main actors under international law.
167
 Corporations and corporate executives that 
contributed to the war efforts and profited from the Nazi regime were prosecuted for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.  
There are a limited number of crimes under international law that can be committed by 
individuals and thus held directly liable under international law. Currently these are genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
168
 Yet, even if responsibility extends to non-state 
actors directly under international law, it nevertheless only applies to a limited number of 
crimes. The Nuremberg Charter imposes individual responsibility on accomplices.
169
 
Corporate executives are subject to international law similar to other individuals.
170
 Corporate 
complicity, including aiding and abetting, was at this time also established as officials were 
indicted and convicted.
171
Additionally, while the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were 
formed, the UN Security Council codified provisions of customary international law. Both the 
statutes of the ICTY as well as ICTR impose individual criminal responsibility on private 
individuals that aid and abet in the planning, preparation or execution on acts of genocide, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.
172
 The International Law Commission (ILC) also imposed 
accomplice liability in the ILC Draft Code which is considered authoritative as an 
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international instrument by the ICTY.
173
 Further the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court also imposes similar responsibility.
174
 
 
7.4 Corporate accountability under Unocal  
It was not until the decision of Doe v. Unocal that MNCs were successfully held responsible 
under the ATCA.
175
 The American company Unocal had a project in Myanmar where the 
company jointly with a subsidiary from Myanmar was setting up a pipeline for natural gas 
extraction. The project was not welcomed by the local population near the area, hence 
required security measures. Unocal allowed the Myanmar military to be hired for security 
purposes over the project, even though they had knowledge of prior forced labor practices by 
the military. The military of Myanmar helped the project by clearing and building roads along 
the proposed route of the pipeline. Evidence presented before the court included that the 
company was notified of the atrocities committed by the military, yet continued to accept 
work on the project. In 1996 the plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court of California, yet the 
court dismissed the claims against the Myanmar military and the Myanmar owned company 
that Unocal was co-operating with since they are protected under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.
176
 Unocal on the other hand could be sued as an American-based company.
177
 
The case was remanded by the Ninth Circuit and complicity was used as the approach to 
indict Unocal for human rights violations. 
The plaintiffs of the case were villagers from the neighboring area of the project. The 
Myanmar military allegedly committed rape, murder, torture, forced displacement and forced 
labor. The Ninth Circuit found that forced labor can be a violation of international law, also 
citing the Kadic case that private actors can be liable without the requirement of State action 
under the ATCA for violations of jus cogens norms. The Ninth Circuit Court also determined 
that forced labor is the modern equivalent of slavery thus making it a violation of a jus cogens 
norm. Unocal was further tried for aiding and abetting in the actions of the Myanmar military. 
The international law definition of aiding and abetting consists of knowledge, practical 
assistance, or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.
178
 
With this standard the pipeline project could be considered forced labor. The Court found that 
State action was not required in proving the acts of murder and rape, since these acts were 
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committed in furtherance of forced labor which is a jus cogens norm. After the case of Sosa 
was decided, Unocal decided to settle with the plaintiffs.
179
 
The Unocal court looked to the ICTY case Prosecutor v. Furundzija where the concept of 
aiding and abetting in international criminal law consists of actus reus, consisting of practical 
assistance, encouragement or moral support that has a substantial effect on the crime and its 
perpetration.
180
 Mens rea is the knowledge of the assistance that the acts are committed as 
part of an offence. An element of the court‟s conclusion was drawn from the Rome Statute of 
the ICC and ICTY. US courts have found that this standard reflects international law.
181
 The 
Doe v. Unocal case thus held that an international norm on individual responsibility can 
extend to MNCs. It is also believed that the case was groundbreaking for human rights 
activism and corporate accountability. In the Unocal case the universal crimes were found to 
be slave trading, genocide or war crimes along with other crimes committed in furtherance of 
crimes that are under that category.
182
 Since this decision, several other corporations have 
been found accountable under the ATCA. Corporations committing human rights violations in 
conjunction with foreign corporate entities can be scrutinized under the ATCA and 
international law. The landmark decisions of Unocal and Kadic have thus allowed the ATCA 
to hold MNCs liable for violations of international law under two standards, jus cogens norms 
and State action. 
  
7.5 The US Supreme Court decision Sosa 
The importance of the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain case is the reference of applicable norms 
under the ATCA.
 183
 It is the only US Supreme Court (USSC) decision to this date. The case 
was decided in favor of the defendant, but the Sosa case has been cited by both sides to 
support the actionable claims for violations of the law of nations.
184
  It holds that private 
parties, such as corporations, can be liable under the ATCA. Dr Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 
a medical doctor in Mexico, was kidnapped from his office in Guadalajara and held captive in 
a motel to be transported to Texas, US.  In Texas he was arrested by federal officers.
185
 The 
US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had previously attempted to transfer Alvarez to 
the US for his alleged participation in the torture and murder of a DEA agent. The Mexican 
government refused to extradite Alvarez and the DEA decided to act without the support of 
the government. The trial resulted in a judgment of acquittal. Upon Alvarez‟s return to 
Mexico he sued among others Jose Fransisco Sosa for the participation of his abduction and 
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arbitrary arrest from Mexico to the US. Sosa argued that the ATCA did not provide for a 
cause of action and that further congressional action was required before the claims could be 
heard. Alvarez in turn contended that the law of nations granted a cause of action.
186
 The US 
Supreme Court concluded that the First Congress at the enactment of the ATCA intended the 
federal courts to provide for a common law cause of action, albeit for a modest set of 
violations under the law of nations. The Act provides for a jurisdictional grant, however 
common law provides for a cause of action.
187
 The US Supreme Court justified the position 
by stating that Congress had not objected or asserted any limitation of the prior holdings, 
rather it supplemented the ATCA with the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act.
188
 
In conclusion the Court rejected Alvarez‟s claims of arbitrary detention as the claim was 
considered within jurisdiction but didn‟t fulfill the requirements of violating international law.  
In the decision the Supreme Court stated that actionable violations are required to be 
definable or specific, universal and obligatory.
189
 The USSC also concluded that the federal 
courts should consider foreign policy and the practical implications of the decisions. The 
USSC asserted that claims resting on the law of nations are to rest on current norms of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18
th
-century paradigms.
 
The definition is thus dependent on 
the actions that fall within customary international law and the norms that are comparable 
with specificity to how safe conducts, the rights of ambassadors and piracy were in 1789.
190
 
However, the debate among scholars on the legitimate way of defining and interpreting 
current customary international law is divided. The Sosa decision clearly states that the courts 
have no congressional mandate to define new and debatable violations of the law of 
nations.
191
 The court also recognized that only a narrow class of international norms provide 
for such a cause of action.
192
  
The Sosa case stresses certain important factors to bear in mind when applying the Act. The 
litigation of the ATCA should be restrained to apply under clear norms, thus limiting the 
scope of the Act. The list of crimes that attract universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law is indeed in practice very short and most likely does not extend beyond 
crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as the Sosa case states. Valid 
sources of support of international law have been discussed by the court in Sosa. Treaties, 
legislative acts or judicial decisions are important sources, yet absent such support, the 
                                                          
186
 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-713 (2004). 
187
 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
188
 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004). 
189
 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004), citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
781 (1984). 
190 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124, 695, 725 (2004). See also In re South African Apartheid 
Litigation, 346 F Supp 2d 538, 547 (SDNY 2004). 
191
 Petty, supra note 146, at 9. 
192
 Stapp, supra note 161, at 505. 
41 
 
practice of civilized nations is appropriate. The work of jurists and commentators are also 
legitimate sources.
193
 
 
7.6 Corporate complicity 
The attribution of corporate complicity is a rather complex task. MNCs acting as accomplices 
to violations committed by a host State can be responsible to abuses under international law. 
Three categories have been identified by legal commentators: direct complicity, indirect 
complicity and mere presence in the country coupled with complicity through silence or 
inaction.
194
 Corporations can be responsible for the committed abuses by facilitation or 
directly participate in the abuses in conjunction with government agents. Furthermore, even if 
the corporation is not involved in the violations, it can benefit from the failure of 
governmental protection of human rights.
195
 International case law has relied on disparate 
doctrines and follows different precedents.
196
 The vocabulary employed is also rather 
inconsistent.
197
 To establish whether a corporation has acted in complicity, a few factors need 
to be considered. The corporation must have acted with intent and/or knowledge or 
recklessness, and the corporation must have contributed in a direct and material way to the 
crime.
198
 This allows parent corporations to be held responsible in the most egregious 
circumstances. This doctrine however, is not applied in all nations worldwide nor is it applied 
in a consistent manner.
199
  There are a variety of strategies that corporations can employ in 
order to escape responsibility for actions committed on foreign soil. The governments of 
developing countries either have no interest to protect locals or are unable to ensure effective 
protection. MNC can also create subsidiaries with a distinct personality and claim 
impunity.
200
 The problem arises when there is no central control, when the different entities 
are bound by independent or exclusive contractual relationships. Rather than directly 
conducting the violations, complicity argues that corporate entities are responsible for their 
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actions with employees, private security firms, government agents, including police and 
military, as well as nongovernmental groups such as rebel groups and paramilitary 
organizations.  
Aiding and abetting is actionable under the well-established US common law of torts. To this 
point there has been limited analysis on the history of aiding and abetting for violating the law 
of nations, both in case law as well as scholarship. It has been argued, that during the time of 
the Founders when piracy was rampant, aiding and abetting piracy was recognized.
201
 In Sosa 
the court measured Alvarez-Machain‟s detention against the history of the violations of the 
law of nations. By referencing the categories of aiding and abetting to the law of nations as it 
was in the time when the Act was endorsed, the present US courts were able to maintain 
jurisdiction.202 The courts of both Sosa and Filartiga judged the cases against the benchmark 
of piracy. 
The doctrine is also universally recognized under customary international law and has been 
sustained since the Nuremberg trials. The Supreme Court did not explicitly consider aiding 
and abetting under Sosa, however courts have to a great degree reasoned and debated on the 
doctrine. Several courts have held that aiding and abetting is appropriate under the ATCA, yet 
the question still remains whether international law or federal common law provides for the 
appropriate standard.
203
 There is, at this present time, no consensus on this issue.  
 
7.7 Khulumani and the reference to criminal law 
Recently there have been several consolidated actions to redress human rights violations 
committed in South Africa under the apartheid regime.
204
 Plaintiffs include residents that were 
injured from the year 1948-1994 alleging violations by MNCs that conducted business in the 
region.
205
 The district court made an important reference that warrants some clarification. The 
court declared that the holdings of the Nuremberg tribunals or International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda establishes criminal rather than civil 
standards and are thus not applicable.
206
 The district court also declined to apply the 
Convention on apartheid since the US had not ratified it at the time and other Conventions 
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concerning criminal liability were found not applicable to civil remedies.
207
 These are 
important concerns that justices still strongly disagree on.
208
 
The plaintiffs appealed and in 2007 the Second Circuit in the opinion Khulumani v. Barclay 
Nat'l Bank, Ltd. remanded the case.
209
 The Second Circuit agreed that aiding and abetting 
violations can be under the jurisdiction, yet had a split vote on whether customary 
international law or federal common law determines the scope of the doctrine.
210
 A writ of 
certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court in January 2008 by the defendants. Among the 
questions of interest was whether litigation should be dismissed on the grounds of deference 
to the political branches and political question, as well as whether aiding and abetting by a 
private defendant is a violation of international law when committed by a foreign government. 
These issues were brought forward indicating important questions that need to be resolved 
now and for the future. The petition inclined broad interest and several trade organizations 
filed amicus briefs. The Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae requesting the USSC to 
resolve the issue on aiding and abetting liability on behalf of the defendants.
211
 The USSC 
upheld the Second Circuit‟s decision to allow litigation in the opinion American Isuzu Motors, 
Inc. v. Ntsebeza.
212
 Note however that this decision was not based on the merits but for a lack 
of quorum and the Court could thus not grant certiorari.
213
 The justices had to recuse, though 
no reasons were given for the decision.
214
 The holding in Khulumani is thus still accurate as 
the Second Circuit abides by it.
215
 It is still important to note that there is no US Supreme 
Court decision to confirm the doctrine of aiding and abetting apart from the recused case.
216
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The result in Khulumani case left several litigation matters unanswered, indicating that the 
questions raised were extremely delicate and raise political proclamations as well as the 
concerns from NGOs.  
 
7.8 Future claims that can affect multinational corporations 
There are various standards under international law that US domestic courts may apply in 
order to determine accomplice liability under the ATCA. Some of these have not been tried to 
this point, yet may in the future be employed depending on the development of litigation 
under the ATCA. International law has five different theories of third party liability that are 
clearly defined and universally accepted. These can all potentially be employed in federal 
courts and MNCs should follow their development. The theories include, aiding and abetting, 
joint criminal enterprise, conspiracy, procurement and instigation.
217
 Other common law torts 
that can be available include joint venture, agency and recklessness.
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Human rights litigation in the US may also contain issues not only of international character 
and from federal law, but also state law. There are considerable barriers to achieve 
jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries making it easier to prosecute a parent company based in 
the home State instead. Under US domestic law the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is 
broadly employed to impose liability on subsidiaries or parent companies. It provides an 
opportunity to look past the formal label of co-operation and instead see to the level of 
exercised control. In domestic law, these subsidiaries can be considered distinct legal persons 
and entities separate from the parent company, yet in human rights cases it can facilitate 
accountability if given consideration.
219
 It is an unresolved matter whether this doctrine can 
apply to international human rights breaches and thus which actors can potentially be held 
liable.
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Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 2, at 218 (2008). 
217 Criminal joint enterprise was employed in an ICTY case, see Stapp, supra note 161, at 520. The standard of 
conspiracy is well recognized both in US as well as international law, thus is a potential ground of liability, see 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 249 (Dec. 10, 1998) and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320–324 (SDNY 2003).  Corporations providing a government with 
equipment, facilities or funding to secure operations in violations of human rights can be held responsible for 
procurement, as found in the Unocal and Talisman cases, see Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 
2002), and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F Supp 2d 289 (SDNY 2003). The 
international standard of instigation has considerably been employed by the ICTR with the incitement to 
genocide and other violence, yet is also recognized in US tort law. See Stapp, supra note 161, at 520-521.  
218 Herz, supra note 216, at 216-217. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007) and Doe I v. 
Unocal, 395 F 3d 932, 970 (9th Cir. 2002), Doe v. Unocal, 963 F Supp 880, 896 (CD Cal 1997). 
219
 The doctrine is however only employed when certain requirements are met, yet the conditions vary in each 
state. Merely ownership of stocks is insufficient. Wilson, supra note 34, at 63. 
220
 Ibid, 63-66. Joint venture and other agency relationship can impose limited liability to the owners of a 
business. Individuals responsible for the violations and its decision-making, such as the CEO (Chief Executive 
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8 FUTURE IMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMS RAISED 
IN THE EU AND US COURTS  
 
The continuing expansion of trade across borders has implications to corporate conduct and 
human rights. In light of this expansion it has become necessary for multinational 
corporations to consider the development of international law and the impact that current and 
future changes have on the European practice and the Alien Tort Claims Act. MNCs have to 
consider several regulations and laws, ranging from voluntary instruments on corporate 
conduct, international human rights law, local regulations and laws of the host State and those 
of the home State. The range of regulations and laws do not confer to a clear structure on 
responsibility. The important factor for corporations to bear in mind is that the scope of 
universal jurisdiction is expanding and more and more countries are beginning to adopt 
regulations addressing MNCs, and their conduct both in the home State and abroad. The 
European Union confers jurisdiction on corporations in the home State, however the 
application is limited. The ATCA on the other hand yields broad remedies to human rights 
atrocities. Civil remedies similar to the ATCA are at present not available in the EU. 
International norms provided by the UN and OECD account for a wide number of influential 
instruments, however these are non-binding in nature. Some States have chosen to implement 
such regulations to the domestic sphere, for instance, the Swedish government has chosen to 
abide to the norms set by the OECD and UN through self-regulation. Swedish corporations 
need to follow the guidelines and regulations, but have some flexibility. The demands of the 
global market and the international economy mean that self-regulation is a necessary attribute 
for MNCs. While the corporate structure of MNCs can benefit from the flexibility of self-
regulation, the issue of human rights violations still persist. The difficulties of obtaining a 
legally binding instrument on the international level are quite clear, however there is a 
possibility of obtaining a remedy based on future developments of customary international 
law. 
 
8.1 Summary: Corporate accountability under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
The persistence of considerable uncertainty in US courts as to the legitimacy of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act is a great obstacle to successful litigation. Despite the US Supreme Court limiting 
the application of the ATCA and international law only covering a limited number of 
offences, the Act remains an important legal tool to vindicate the victims of human rights 
violations. Multinational corporations have become a target of the Act and foremost under the 
doctrine of aiding and abetting. To claim liability of a corporation under the Act certain 
requirements must be met. Once a claim has been brought by a plaintiff, the court establishes 
whether a corporation or a private individual can be subject to the applicable norms. The court 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Officer), CFO (Chief Financial Officer) or owners can be held accountable, yet in the US institutional investors 
merely own shares as a financial instrument and do not merit any conduct over the business as such. 
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has to decide the applicable standard, commonly third party liability, and the offence must be 
universally condemned and well defined. The specific norm must either establish that no State 
action is required but that a private party may be held responsible, or, if State action is 
required, there needs to be sufficient links with State action. As of today only four violations 
of the law of nations have been granted as actionable without the requirement of State action 
under the ATCA. To this point genocide, war crimes, forced labor or slavery as well as crimes 
against humanity have been under litigation. US proceedings have proved that trial courts and 
appellate courts do not concur on the issues, and several cases indicate that the litigation is 
uncertain since a federal court may decide that customary international law applies in a 
certain manner. The ATCA itself contains several ambiguous features and this inconsistency 
is portrayed by the lack of a controlling precedent. The significance of the ATCA derives 
from the interrelation with common law and international law. Customary international law is 
constantly evolving and this subjects the ATCA to constant modification and debate. Among 
the difficulties of following customary international law is that scholars do not agree on the 
matters at hand and international consensus is hard to obtain. The present debate mainly 
revolves around the actionable torts under the ATCA and sources of law that apply. Case law 
provides that corporations are not only not allowed to directly violate the norms, but are not 
allowed to be complicit in the violations committed abroad in the countries they invest in or 
private parties with whom they interact. Both prospective claimants and defendants however 
call for clarification and limitation of the persistent ambiguity. Claimants want to discern the 
cause of action while defendants want to be able to revise corporate behavior and avoid 
claims under the ATCA. While the Act can serve as a deterrent function to corporate 
misconduct, it would be of great benefit to all actors to improve the structure and standing of 
corporate accountability with regards to human rights. 
 
8.1.1 Can the EU achieve accountability similar to the Alien Tort Claims 
  Act? 
The laws of EU Member States may provide a cause of action to hear tort claims under the 
universality principle, yet the absence of universal tort jurisdiction in European practice is 
vital to the fact that MNCs most likely will not be subject to similar litigation as corporations 
in the US. As an alternative, criminal jurisdiction is employed by some European States and 
victims of human rights can claim criminal remedies. The development in Europe will instead 
depend on the acts of governments and the European Union, as well as how international law 
and self-regulation will proceed. If Regulation No 44/2001 will be employed in the future, 
non-European victims of human rights may find the jurisdiction more hospitable with greater 
possibilities to hold European corporations accountable. However the principle of lex loci 
delicti limits the possibilities to hear claims in the EU since it determines both jurisdiction and 
the applicable law. Furthermore the EU intends to promote the OECD Guidelines as well as 
the regulations of the UN thus providing that international norms are being adhered to as well 
as promoting international competitiveness of European enterprises. This is precisely what the 
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Swedish government has chosen to do, and Swedish companies listed on the securities market 
need to take in to account the development of international law. Thus corporations in both the 
US and Europe are subject to changes in international law and must do their utmost to 
embrace voluntary instruments. 
  
8.2 Future and current legal status of multinational corporations and                        
 human rights 
Multinational corporations are governed under several regimes and the stages of development 
vary from State to State. The means to promote human rights by multinational corporations is 
mainly focused in the international setting or by regulations from the home State of the MNC. 
Assigning the responsibility of monitoring the protection of human rights to host States is 
sometimes impractical due to the host States themselves being involved in the abuse of human 
rights. The competitiveness of products and services from developing nations derives from 
low costs coupled with lenient regulations and standards. In order to impose efficient 
regulations on MNCs an international mandate may prove successful. In particular developing 
nations will not fear a disadvantage by imposing regulations, if the requirements are set by the 
international community or the home State. The available means for home States to regulate 
the activities of MNCs is however rather limited. Multinational corporations can move capital 
between different jurisdictions and create flexible corporate structures to create subsidiaries 
that are independent from their parent company. To battle such implications it appears that a 
twofold approach of both international and domestic measures supplementing one another is 
required. 
Accountability of multinational corporations can largely take two directions. The international 
community can rely on countries to regulate the conduct of MNCs on State level, or 
international law can directly impose liability on the corporations. Both levels can promote 
voluntary approaches and corporate self-regulation or provide a binding legal framework. 
Consensus on the international level is nevertheless hard to obtain. Some international 
measures have failed or fallen short due to lack of consensus while self-regulation has 
prevailed. The first international level currently does not codify any consistent legal pattern, it 
merely promotes principled corporate conduct by flexible standards.  
If the second State level is chosen to permit domestic law and regulations to govern and 
control the implication of multinational enterprises, it is highly likely that there will be less 
conformity between States, and MNCs will struggle to recognize the scope of responsibility. 
The State level is perhaps the prevailing level as of now, which, despite the international 
instruments, has in practice resulted in scarce protection of human rights. The strikingly high 
number of applications for summons under the ATCA, although most of them dismissed, 
contends the need for greater transparency of corporate responsibility. 
The discussion of accountability mainly revolves around the extent of corporate liability, how 
responsibility can and should be encouraged. A question of interest is the preference of how 
to confront corporate misconduct, whether a legal and hence binding resolution is favorable, 
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or rather self-regulation and voluntary measures are beneficial to the corporate structure as 
well as the promotion of human rights. From a corporate perspective self-regulation is 
beneficial, yet from a human rights perspective a legal resolution is preferred to protect 
victims. However since corporate structures may vary to such a great extent, self-regulation is 
essential. The emerging corporate structures, with outsourcing and the utilization of sub-
contractors and supply chains, has also altered the approach of corporate accountability. It is 
also reasonable to conclude that guidelines and recommendations concerning multinational 
conduct will become binding and standardized in corporate practice. Codes of conduct and 
CSR may have a vital impact and be of legal importance if given consideration by 
implementation in contracts or in marketing efforts by companies. To facilitate the 
recognition of corporate efforts as well as monitoring the adherence of the norms it is crucial 
that the norms are uniform for consumers and other actors of society to evaluate corporate 
measures. If the codes are short of an independent and public monitoring mechanism, the 
concrete benefit is undermined reducing the code to an exercise in public relations. The 
voluntary initiatives may become far more binding than originally intended due to 
competition in the global market and thus become a necessary element in the formation of 
business contracts. 
Corporate accountability is very much at a formative stage of development. The prospects of 
promoting good corporate conduct are subject to how States choose to govern corporate 
responsibility and corporations choose to apply self-regulation. The international level can 
promote uniform corporate standards, which is essential to assert good corporate conduct. 
Thus both an approach on the international level as well as through the act of States is 
required in order to battle the impunity of MNCs. Both levels have positive and negative 
aspects. The distinction between legally binding and voluntary measures should not be strictly 
drawn since self-regulation and codes of conduct are essential to promote good corporate 
governance and particularly in the long term legal remedies may be invoked from these same 
codes and practices.  
 
8.3 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has discussed corporate accountability and the available means for plaintiffs to 
find a forum for remedy. While plaintiffs may have an available forum to voice their concerns 
and file claims, as foreign nationals there are several obstacles in the claims actually being 
heard. Foreign nationals often find courts abroad inhospitable and a court process is time 
consuming and far more burdensome placed in a foreign court system. Both multinational 
corporations as well as victims of human rights have no certain knowledge whether they can 
be prosecuted or can prosecute. This debate creates legal uncertainty. There is a great call for 
clarification of the elements that constitute accountability. Swift measures to improve the 
accountability of corporate actors must be taken to prevent future abuses of human rights, and 
if enacted, will benefit both claimants and plaintiffs. 
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